openssl/sme8/openssl-fips-0.9.8e-cve-2012-2333.patch

Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
to fix DoS attack.
Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
diff -up openssl-fips-0.9.8e/ssl/d1_enc.c.reclen openssl-fips-0.9.8e/ssl/d1_enc.c
--- openssl-fips-0.9.8e/ssl/d1_enc.c.reclen     2006-02-08 20:16:32.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-fips-0.9.8e/ssl/d1_enc.c    2012-05-15 12:14:25.510013029 +0200
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                                }
                        /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
                         * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-                       if (i > (int)rec->length)
+                       if (i + bs > (int)rec->length)
                                {
                                /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
                                 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
1	wellsi	1.1	Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
2			to fix DoS attack.
3			Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
4			fuzzing as a service testing platform.
5			(CVE-2012-2333)
6			diff -up openssl-fips-0.9.8e/ssl/d1_enc.c.reclen openssl-fips-0.9.8e/ssl/d1_enc.c
7			--- openssl-fips-0.9.8e/ssl/d1_enc.c.reclen 2006-02-08 20:16:32.000000000 +0100
8			+++ openssl-fips-0.9.8e/ssl/d1_enc.c 2012-05-15 12:14:25.510013029 +0200
9			@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
10			}
11			/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
12			* All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
13			- if (i > (int)rec->length)
14			+ if (i + bs > (int)rec->length)
15			{
16			/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
17			* by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is